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is. But he cannot restrict himself to this problem without ignoring the greatest of human interests. The nature of reality and the meaning of worth appeal to him equally. To attain a point of view from which their relations are intelligible is the object of his search; and this involves something more than loyalty to facts; it needs equal loyalty to ideals of worth. That it is hard to maintain the attitude of impartial regard to fact, on the one hand, and to ideal, on the other, need not be denied. That it is still harder to reach the point of view that will comprehend them both harmoniously, is obvious. It may be that no philosopher has ever attained, or ever will attain, a fully satisfactory solution. He may be fated always to be a seeker. But the search is not therefore vain. Science, as we have seen, has to frame and use conceptions which go far beyond the mere data of sense-perception, and their abundant verification is evidence of a harmony between the intellect of man and the truth of things. His ideas of worth lay claim to a similar objectivity. And it is this that justifies the creative attitude of the speculative philosopher. It is because his own mind has in it something akin both to objective fact and to objective worth that he embarks on the quest for their final synthesis.

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CHRISTIAN MORALS AND THE COMPETITIVE SYSTEM.

THORSTEIN VEBLEN.

IN the light of the current materialistic outlook and the current skepticism touching supernatural matters, some question may fairly be entertained as to the religious cult of Christianity. Its fortunes in the proximate future, as well as its intrinsic value for the current scheme of civilization, may be subject to doubt. But a

similar doubt is not readily entertained as regards the morals of Christianity. In some of its elements this morality is so intimately and organically connected with the scheme of Western civilization that its elimination would signify a cultural revolution whereby occidental culture would lose its occidental characteristics and fall into the ranks of ethnic civilizations at large. Much the same may be said of that pecuniary competition which to-day rules the economic life of Christendom and in large measure guides Western civilization in much else than the economic respect.

Both are institutional factors of first-rate importance in this culture, and as such it might be difficult or impracticable to assign the primacy to the one or the other, since each appears to be in a dominant position. Western civilization is both Christian and competitive (pecuniary); and it seems bootless to ask whether its course is more substantially under the guidance of the one than of the other of these two institutional norms. Hence, if it should appear, as is sometimes contended, that there is an irreconcilable discrepancy between the two, the student of this culture might have to face the question: Will Western civilization dwindle and decay if one or the other, the morals of competition or the morals of Christianity, definitively fall into abeyance?

In a question between the two codes, or systems of conduct, each must be taken at its best and simplest. That is to say, it is a question of agreement or discrepancy in the larger elementary principles of each, not a question of the variegated details, nor of the practice of the common run of Christians, on the one hand, and of competitive business men, on the other. The variety of detailed elaboration and sophistication is fairly endless in both codes; at the same time many Christians are engaged in competitive business, and conversely. Under the diversified exigencies of daily life neither the accepted principles of morality nor those of business competition work out in an untroubled or untempered course

of conduct. Circumstances constrain men unremittingly to shrewd adaptations, if not to some degree of compromise, in their endeavors to live up to their accustomed principles of conduct. Yet both of these principles, or codes of conduct, are actively present throughout life in any modern community. For all the shrewd adaptation to which they may be subject in the casuistry of individual practice, they will not have fallen into abeyance so long as the current scheme of life is not radically altered. Both the Christian morality and the morality of pecuniary competition are intimately involved in this occidental scheme of life; for it is out of these and the like habits of thought that the scheme of life is made up. Taken at their best, do the two further and fortify one another? do they work together without mutual help or hindrance? or do they mutually inhibit and defeat each other?

In the light of modern science the principles of Christian morality or of pecuniary competition must, like any other principles of conduct, be taken simply as prevalent habits of thought. And in this light no question can be entertained as to the intrinsic merit, the eternal validity, of either. They are, humanly speaking, institutions which have arisen in the growth of the Western civilization. Their genesis and growth are incidents, or possibly episodes, in the life-history of this culture—habits of thought induced by the discipline of life in the course of this culture's growth, and more or less intrinsic and essential to its character as a phase of civilization. Therefore the question of their consistency with one another, or with the cultural scheme in which they are involved, turns into a question as to the conditions to which they owe their rise and continued force as institutions,—as to the discipline of experience in the past, out of which each of them has come and to which, therefore, each is (presumably) suited. The exigencies of life and the discipline of experience in a complex cultural situation are many and diverse, and it is always

possible that any given phase of culture may give rise to divergent lines of institutional growth, to habits of conduct which are mutually incompatible, and which may at the same time be incompatible with the continued life of that cultural situation which has brought them to pass. The dead civilizations of history, particularly the greater ones, seem commonly to have died of some such malady. If Christian morality and pecuniary competition are the outgrowth of the same or similar lines of habituation, there should presumably be no incompatibility or discrepancy between them; otherwise it is an open question.

Leaving on one side, then, all question of its divine or supernatural origin, force, and warrant, as well as of its truth and its intrinsic merit or demerit, it may be feasible to trace the human line of derivation of this spirit of Christianity, considered as a spiritual attitude habitual to civilized mankind. The details and mutations of the many variants of the cult and creed might likewise be traced back, by shrewd analysis, to their origins in the habits enforced by past civilized life, and might on this ground be appraised in respect of their fitness to survive under the changing conditions of later culture; but such a work of detailed inquiry is neither practicable nor necessary here. The variants are many and diverse, but for all the diversity and discord among them, they have certain large features in common, by which they are identified as Christian and are contrasted with the ethnic cults and creeds. There is a certain Christian animus which pervades most of them, and marks them off against the non-Christian spiritual world. This is, perhaps, more particularly true of the moral principles of Christianity than of the general fabric of its many creeds and cults. Certain elemental features of this Christian animus stand forth obtrusively in its beginnings, and have, with varying fortunes of dominance and decay, persisted or survived unbroken, on the whole, to the present day. These are non-resistance (hu-

mility) and brotherly love. Something further might be added, perhaps, but this much is common, in some degree, to the several variants of Christianity, late or early; and the inclusion of other common principles besides these would be debatable and precarious, except in case of such moral principles as are also common to certain of the ethnic cults as well as to Christianity. Even with respect to the two principles named, there might be some debate as to their belonging peculiarly and characteristically to the Christian spirit, exclusive of all other spiritual habits of mind. But it is at least a tenable position that these principles are intrinsic to the Christian spirit, and that they habitually serve as competent marks of identification. With the exclusion or final obsolescence of either of these, the cult would no longer be Christian, in the current acceptation of the term; though much else, chiefly not of an ethical character, would have to be added to make up a passably complete characterization of the Christian system, as, *e. g.*, monotheism, sin and atonement, eschatological retribution, and the like. But the two principles named bear immediately on the morals of Christianity; they are, indeed, the spiritual capital with which the Christian movement started out, and they are still the characteristics by force of which it survives.

It is commonly held that these principles are not inherent traits of human nature as such, congenital and hereditary traits of the species which assert themselves instinctively, impulsively, by force of the mere absence of repression. Such, at least, in effect, is the teaching of the Christian creeds, in that they hold these spiritual qualities to be a gift of divine grace, not a heritage of sinful human nature. Such an account of their origin and their acquirement by the successive generations of men does not fit these two main supports of Christian morality in the same degree. It may fairly be questioned as regards the principle of brotherly love, or the impulse to mutual service. While this seems to be a characteristic trait of Christian morals and may serve as

a specific mark by which to distinguish this morality from the greater non-Christian cults, it is apparently a trait which Christendom shares with many of the obscurer cultures, and which does not in any higher degree characterize Christendom than it does these other, lower cultures. In the lower, non-Christian cultures, particularly among the more peaceable communities of savages, something of the kind appears to prevail by mere force of hereditary propensity; at least it appears, in some degree, to belong in these lower civilizations without being traceable to special teaching or to a visible interposition of divine grace. And in an obscure and dubious fashion, perhaps sporadically, it recurs throughout the life of human society with such an air of ubiquity as would argue that it is an elemental trait of the species, rather than a cultural product of Christendom. It may not be an overstatement to say that this principle is, in its elements, in some sort an atavistic trait, and that Christendom comes by it through a cultural reversion to the animus of the lower (peaceable) savage culture. But even if such an account be admitted as substantially sound, it does not account for that cultural reversion to which Christendom owes its peculiar partiality for this principle; nor is its association with its fellow principle, non-resistance, thereby accounted for. The two come into play together in the beginnings of Christianity, and are thenceforward associated together, more or less inseparably, throughout the later vicissitudes of the cult and its moral code.

The second-named principle, of non-resistance and renunciation, is placed first in order of importance in the earlier formulations of Christian conduct. This is not similarly to be traced back as a culturally atavistic trait, as the outgrowth of such an archaic cultural situation as is offered by the lower savagery. Non-resistance has no such air of ubiquity and spontaneous recrudescence, and does not show itself, even sporadically, as a matter of course in cultures that are otherwise apparently un-

related; particularly not in the lower cultures, where the hereditary traits of the species should presumably assert themselves, on occasion, in a less sophisticated expression than on the more highly conventionalized levels of civilization. On the contrary, it belongs almost wholly to the more highly developed, more coercively organized civilizations, that are possessed of a consistent monotheistic religion and a somewhat arbitrary secular authority; and it is not always, indeed not commonly, present in these.

Christianity at its inception did not take over this moral principle, ready-made, from any of the older cults or cultures from which the Christian movement was in a position to draw. It is not found, at least not in appreciable force, in the received Judaism; nor can it be derived from the classical (Græco-Roman) cultures, which had none of it, nor is it to be found among the pagan antiquities of those barbarians whose descendants make up the great body of Christendom to-day. Yet Christianity sets out with the principle of non-resistance full-blown, in the days of its early diffusion, and finds assent and acceptance for it with such readiness as seems to argue that mankind was prepared beforehand for just such a principle of conduct. Mankind, particularly the populace, within the confines of that Roman dominion within which the early diffusion of Christianity took place, was apparently in a frame of mind to accept such a principle of morality, or such a maxim of conduct; and the same is progressively true for the outlying populations to which Christianity spread in the next four centuries.

To any modern student of human culture, this ready acceptance of such a principle (habit of thought) gives evidence that the section of mankind which had thus shifted its moral footing to a new and revolutionary moral principle, must have been trained, by recently past experience, by the discipline of daily life in the immediate past, into such a frame of mind as predisposed them

for its acceptance; that is to say, they must have been disciplined into a spiritual attitude to which such a new principle of conduct would commend itself as reasonable, if not as a matter of course. And in due process, as this suitable attitude was enforced upon the other, outlying, populations by suitable disciplinary means, Christianity with its gospel of renunciation tended to spread and supplant the outworn cults that no longer fitted the altered cultural situation. But in its later diffusion, among peoples not securely under Roman rule and not reduced to such a frame of mind by a protracted experience of Roman discipline, Christianity makes less capital of the morality of non-resistance.

It was among the peoples subject to the Roman rule that Christianity first arose and spread; among the lower orders of the populace especially, who had been beaten to a pulp by the hard-handed, systematic, inexorable power of the imperial city; who had no rights which the Roman master was bound to respect; who were aliens and practically outlaws under the sway of the Cæsars; and who had acquired, under high pressure, the conviction that non-resistance was the chief of virtues if not the whole duty of man. They had learned to render unto Cæsar that which is Cæsar's, and were in a frame of mind to render unto God that which is God's.

It is a notable fact also that, as a general rule, in its subsequent diffusion to regions and peoples not benefited by the Roman discipline, Christianity spread in proportion to the more or less protracted experience of defeat and helpless submission undergone by these peoples; and that it was the subject populace rather than the master classes that took kindly to the doctrine of non-resistance. In the outlying corners of the western world, such as the Scandinavian and British countries, where subjection to arbitrary rule in temporal matters had been less consistently and less enduringly enforced, the principle of non-resistance took less firm root. And in the days when the peoples of Christendom were sharply differentiated into

ruling and subject classes, non-resistance was accepted by the lower rather than by the upper classes.

Much the same, indeed, is true of the companion principle of mutual succor. On the whole, it is not too bold a generalization to say that these elements of the moral code which distinguish Christianity from the ethnic cults, are elements of the morals of low life, of the subject populace. There is, in point of practical morality, not much to choose, *e. g.*, between the upper-class medieval Christianity and the contemporary Mohammedan morality. It is only in later times, after the Western culture had lost its aristocratic-feudalistic character and had become, in its typical form, though not in all its ramifications, a kind of universalized low-life culture,—it is only at this later period that these principles of low-life morality also became in some degree universalized principles of Christian duty; and it still remains true that these principles are most at home in the more vulgar divisions of the Christian cult. The higher-class variants of Christianity still differ little in the substance of their morality from Judaism or Islam. The morality of the upper class is in a less degree the morality of non-resistance and brotherly love, and is in a greater degree the morality of coercive control and kindly tutelage, which are in no degree distinctive traits of Christianity, as contrasted with the other great religious systems.

In their experience of Roman devastation and punishment-at-large, which predisposed the populace for this principle of non-resistance, the subject peoples commonly also lost such class distinctions and differential rights and privileges as they had previously enjoyed. They were leveled down to a passably homogeneous state of subjection, in which one class or individual had little to gain at the cost of another, and in which, also, each and all palpably needed the succor of all the rest. The institutional fabric had crumbled, very much as it does in an earthquake. The conventional differentiations, handed down out of the past, had proved vain and mean-

ingless in the face of the current situation. The pride of caste and all the principles of differential dignity and honor fell away, and left mankind naked and unashamed and free to follow the promptings of hereditary savage human nature which make for fellowship and Christian charity.

Barring repressive conventionalities, reversion to the spiritual state of savagery is always easy; for human nature is still substantially savage. The discipline of savage life, selective and adaptive, has been by far the most protracted and probably the most exacting of any phase of culture in all the life-history of the race; so that by heredity human nature still is, and must indefinitely continue to be, savage human nature. This savage spiritual heritage that 'springs eternal' when the pressure of conventionality is removed or relieved, seems highly conducive to the two main traits of Christian morality, though more so to the principle of brotherly love than to that of renunciation. And this may well be the chief circumstance that has contributed to the persistence of these principles of conduct even in later times, when the external conditions have not visibly favored or called for their continued exercise.

The principles of conduct underlying pecuniary competition are the principles of Natural Rights, and as such date from the eighteenth century. In respect of their acceptance into the body of commonplace morality and practice and the constraining force which they exercise, they are apparently an outgrowth of modern civilization,—whatever older antiquity may be assigned them in respect of their documentary pedigree. Comparatively speaking, they are absent from the scheme of life and from the common-sense apprehension of rights and duties in medieval times. They derive their warrant as moral principles from the discipline of life under the cultural situation of early modern times. They are accordingly of relatively recent date as prevalent habits of thought,

at least in their fuller and freer development; even though the underlying traits of human nature which have lent themselves to the formation of these habits of thought may be as ancient as any other. The period of their growth coincides somewhat closely with that of the philosophy of egoism, self-interest, or 'individualism,' as it is less aptly called. This egoistic outlook gradually assumes a dominant place in the occidental scheme of thought during and after the transition from medieval to modern times; it appears to be a result of the habituation to those new conditions of life which characterize the modern, as contrasted with the medieval, situation. Assuming, as is now commonly done, that the fundamental and controlling changes which shape and guide the transition from the institutional situation of the medieval to that of the modern world are economic changes, one may with fair confidence trace a connection between these economic changes and the concomitant growth of modern business principles. The vulgar element, held cheap, kept under, but massive, in the medieval order of society, comes gradually into the foreground and into the controlling position in economic life; so that the aristocratic or chivalric standards and ideals are gradually supplanted or displaced by the vulgar apprehension of what is right and best in the conduct of life. The chivalric canons of destructive exploit and of status give place to the more sordid canons of workmanlike efficiency and pecuniary strength. The economic changes which thus gave a new and hitherto impotent element of society the primacy in the social order and in the common-sense apprehensions of what is worth while, are, in the main and characteristically, the growth of handicraft and petty trade; giving rise to the industrial towns, to the growth of markets, to a pecuniary field of individual enterprise and initiative, and to a valuation of men, things, and events in pecuniary terms.

It is impossible here to go narrowly into the traits of culture and of human nature which were evolved in the

rise and progress of handicraft and the petty trade, and brought about the decay of medievalism and the rise of the modern cultural scheme. But so much seems plain on the face of things: there is at work in all this growth of the new, pecuniary culture, a large element of emulation, both in the acquisition of goods and in their conspicuous consumption. Pecuniary exploit in a degree supplies the place of chivalric exploit. But emulation is not the whole of the motive force of the new order, nor does it supply all the canons of conduct and standards of merit under the new order. In its earlier stages, while dominated by the exigencies of handicraft and the petty trade, the modern culture is fully as much shaped and guided by considerations of livelihood, as by the ideals of differential gain.

The material conditions of the new economic situation would not tolerate the institutional conditions of the old situation. There was being enforced upon the community, primarily upon that workday element into whose hands the new industrial exigencies were shifting the directive force, a new range of habitual notions as to what was needful and what was right. In both of the characteristically modern lines of occupation,—handicraft and the petty trade,—the individual, the workman or trader, is the central and efficient factor, on whose initiative, force, diligence, and discretion his own economic fortunes and those of the community visibly turn. It is an economic situation in which, necessarily, individual deals with individual on a footing of pecuniary efficiency; where the ties of group solidarity, which control the individual's economic (and social) relations, are themselves of a pecuniary character, and are made or broken more or less at the individual's discretion and in pecuniary terms; and it is, moreover, a cultural situation in which the social and civil relations binding the individual, are prevailingly and increasingly formed for pecuniary ends, and enforced by pecuniary sanctions. The individualism of the modern era sets out with industrial aims and

makes its way by force of industrial efficiency. And since the individual relations under this system take the pecuniary form, the individualism thus worked out and incorporated in the modern institutional fabric, is a pecuniary individualism, and is therefore also typically egoistic.

The principles governing right conduct according to the habits of thought native to this individualistic era are the egoistic principles of natural rights and natural liberty. These rights and this liberty are egoistic rights and liberty of the individual. They are to be summed up as freedom and security of person and of pecuniary transactions. It is a curious fact, significant of the extreme preponderance of the vulgar element in this cultural revolution, that among these natural rights there are included no remnants of those prerogatives and disabilities of birth, office, or station, which seemed matters of course and of common sense to the earlier generations of men who had grown up under the influence of the medieval social order. Nor, curiously, are there remnants of the more ancient rights and duties of the bond of kinship, the blood feud, or clan allegiance, such as were once also matters of course and of common sense in the cultural eras and areas in which the social order of the kinship group or the clan organization had prevailed. On the other hand, while these institutional elements have (in theory) lost all standing, the analogous institution of property has become an element of the natural order of things. The system of natural rights is natural in the sense of being consonant with the nature of handicraft and petty trade.

Meanwhile, times have changed since the eighteenth century, when this system of pecuniary egoism reached its mature development. That is to say, the material circumstances, the economic exigencies, have changed, and the discipline of habit resulting from the changed situation has, as a consequence, tended to a somewhat different effect, — as is evidenced by the fact that the

sanctity and sole efficacy of the principles of natural rights are beginning to be called in question. The excellence and sufficiency of an enlightened pecuniary egoism are no longer a matter of course and of common sense to the mind of this generation, which has experienced the current era of machine industry, credit, delegated corporation management, and distant markets. What fortune may overtake these business principles, these habits of thought native to the handicraft era, in the further sequence of economic changes, can, of course, not be foretold; but it is at least certain that they cannot remain standing and effective, in the long run, unless the modern community should return to an economic régime equivalent to the era of handicraft and petty trade. For the business principles in question are of the nature of habits of thought, and habits of thought are made by habits of life; and the habits of life necessary to maintain these principles and to give them their effective sanction in the common-sense convictions of the community are the habits of life enforced by the system of handicraft and petty trade.

It appears, then, that these two codes of conduct, Christian morals and business principles, are the institutional by-products of two different cultural situations. The former, in so far as they are typically Christian, arose out of the abjectly and precariously servile relations in which the populace stood to their masters in late Roman times, as also, in a great, though perhaps less, degree, during the 'dark' and the middle ages. The latter, the morals of pecuniary competition, on the other hand, are habits of thought induced by the exigencies of vulgar life under the rule of handicraft and petty trade, out of which has come the peculiar system of rights and duties characteristic of modern Christendom. Yet there is something in common between the two. The Christian principles inculcate brotherly love, mutual succor: Love thy neighbor as thyself; *Mutuum date, nihil inde sper-*

antes. This principle seems, in its elements at least, to be a culturally atavistic trait, belonging to the ancient, not to say primordial, peaceable culture of the lower savagery. The natural-rights analogue of this principle of solidarity and mutual succor is the principle of fair play, which appears to be the nearest approach to the golden rule that the pecuniary civilization will admit. There is no reach of ingenuity or of ingenuousness by which the one of these may be converted into the other; nor does the régime of fair play,—essentially a régime of emulation,—conduce to the reënforcement of the golden rule. Yet throughout all the vicissitudes of cultural change, the golden rule of the peaceable savage has never lost the respect of occidental mankind, and its hold on men's convictions is, perhaps, stronger now than at any earlier period of the modern time. It seems incompatible with business principles, but appreciably less so than with the principles of conduct that ruled the western world in the days before the Grace of God was supplanted by the Rights of Man. The distaste for the spectacle of contemporary life seldom rises to the pitch of 'renunciation of the world' under the new dispensation. While one-half of the Christian moral code, that pious principle which inculcates humility, submission to irresponsible authority, found easier lodgment in the medieval culture, the more humane moral element of mutual succor seems less alien to the modern culture of pecuniary self-help.

The presumptive degree of compatibility between the two codes of morality may be shown by a comparison of the cultural setting, out of which each has arisen and in which each should be at home. In the most general outline, and neglecting details as far as may be, we may describe the upshot of this growth of occidental principles as follows: The ancient Christian principle of humility, renunciation, abnegation, or non-resistance, has been virtually eliminated from the moral scheme of Christendom; nothing better than a sophisticated affectation of

it has any extensive currency in modern life. The conditions to which it owes its rise,—bare-handed despotism and servile helplessness,—are, for the immediate present and the recent past, no longer effectual elements in the cultural situation; and it is, of course, in the recent past that the conditions must be sought which have shaped the habits of thought of the immediate present. Its companion principle, brotherly love or mutual service, appears, in its elements at least, to be a very deeprooted and ancient cultural trait, due to an extremely protracted experience of the race in the early stages of human culture, reënforced and defined by the social conditions prevalent in the early days of Christianity. In the naïve and particular formulation given it by the early Christians, this habit of thought has also lost much of its force, or has fallen somewhat into abeyance; being currently represented by a thrifty charity, and, perhaps, by the negative principle of fair play, neither of which can fairly be rated as a competent expression of the Christian spirit. Yet this principle is forever reasserting itself in economic matters, in the impulsive approval of whatever conduct is serviceable to the common good and in the disapproval of disserviceable conduct even within the limits of legality and natural right. It seems, indeed, to be nothing else than a somewhat specialized manifestation of the instinct of workmanship, and as such it has the indefeasible vitality that belongs to the hereditary traits of human nature.

The pecuniary scheme of right conduct is of recent growth, but it is an outcome of a recently past phase of modern culture rather than of the immediate present. This system of natural rights, including the right of ownership and the principles of pecuniary good and evil that go with it, no longer has the consistent support of current events. Under the conditions prevalent in the era of handicraft, the rights of ownership made for equality rather than the reverse, so that their exercise was in effect not notably inconsistent with the ancient

bias in favor of mutual aid and human brotherhood. This is more particularly apparent if the particular form of organization and the spirit of the regulations then ruling in vulgar life be kept in mind. The technology of handicraft, as well as the market relations of the system of petty trade, pushed the individual workman into the foreground and led men to think of economic interests in terms of this workman and his work; the situation emphasized his creative relation to his product, as well as his responsibility for this product and for its serviceability to the common welfare. It was a situation in which the acquisition of property depended, in the main, on the workmanlike serviceability of the man who acquired it, and in which, on the whole, honesty was the best policy. Under such conditions the principles of fair play and the inviolability of ownership would be somewhat closely in touch with the ancient human instinct of workmanship, which approves mutual aid and serviceability to the common good. On the other hand, the current experience of men in the communities of Christendom, now no longer acts to reënforce these habits of thought embodied in the system of natural rights; and it is scarcely conceivable that a conviction of the goodness, sufficiency, and inviolability of the rights of ownership could arise out of such a condition of things, technological and pecuniary, as now prevails.

Hence there are indications in current events that these principles,—habits of thought,—are in process of disintegration rather than otherwise. With the revolutionary changes that have supervened in technology and in pecuniary relations, there is no longer such a close and visible touch between the workman and his product as would persuade men that the product belongs to him by force of an extension of his personality; nor is there a visible relation between serviceability and acquisition; nor between the discretionary use of wealth and the common welfare. The principles of fair play and pecuniary discretion have, in great measure, lost the sanction once af-

forded them by the human propensity for serviceability to the common good, neutral as that sanction has been at its best. Particularly is this true since business has taken on the character of an impersonal, dispassionate, not to say graceless, investment for profit. There is little in the current situation to keep the natural right of pecuniary discretion in touch with the impulsive bias of brotherly love, and there is in the spiritual discipline of this situation much that makes for an effectual discrepancy between the two. Except for a possible reversion to a cultural situation strongly characterized by ideals of emulation and status, the ancient racial bias embodied in the Christian principle of brotherhood should logically continue to gain ground at the expense of the pecuniary morals of competitive business.

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PAUPERISM: FACTS AND THEORIES.

THOMAS JONES.

AN individualist of the straightest sect would logically object to any poor law at all, but room was found in the *laissez faire* philosophy of the nineteenth century for a poor law as, at the worst, a sink for the lost and, at best, an ambulance for the wounded in the competitive fray. Meanwhile the logic of experience was forcing the administrators of the poor law, on the one hand, and the governors of our cities, on the other, to increase the collective provision for the damaged poor, and to devise measures which would tend to prevent the downward drift to pauperism. But the text-books of the schools continued to repeat the old maxims, unconscious of the corrections of experience, and no new and adequate theory of pauperism was forthcoming. The collectivists, who might have supplied one, were preoccupied with justifying the municipalization of